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A Dispositional Internalist Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology 
 
 
This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs 
dispositions to account for the relation of evidential support. In section one, I explain internalist 
evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support 
stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential support 
has been understood by evidentialists, and argue that an account of support which employs what 
I call epistemic dispositions remedies difficulties arguably faced by these two leading accounts. 
In sections two and three, I turn to advantages that my dispositionalist account of evidential 
support offers evidentialists beyond its remedying apparent difficulties with rival accounts of 
support. In section two, I show that the account is well-suited to help the evidentialist respond to 
the problem of forgotten evidence. And, in section three, I show that adopting my dispositional 
account makes possible an attractive and natural synthesis of evidentialism and virtue 
epistemology which is superior to the leading contemporary synthesis of these views. 
 
1. Internalist Evidentialism and Evidential Support 
 
In this section, I articulate a dispositional account of evidential support and show that it remedies 
difficulties arguably faced by leading alternative accounts of evidential support available to 
internatlist evidentialists. In 1.1, I explain what internalist evidentialism is and how it relies upon 
the relation of evidential support. In 1.2, I articulate my account of evidential support in terms of 
epistemic dispositions. And, in 1.3, I argue that this account escapes difficulties arguably faced 
by probabilistic and explanationist accounts of evidential support. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1.1 Internalist Evidentialism 
 
Evidentialist views are a family of epistemological views which analyze normative epistemic 
properties in terms of evidence and evidential relations. When the relevant evidence is related 
appropriately to a proposition or an attitude toward that proposition, then and only then does that 
proposition or attitude have the normative epistemic property in question.  
 One well-NQRZQYHUVLRQRIHYLGHQWLDOLVPLV(DUO&RQHH¶VDQG5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ¶V
evidentialist account of epistemic justification.1 They propose that an attitude D is epistemically 
MXVWLILHGIRUDVXEMHFW6DWDWLPHWMXVWLQFDVH'LVWKHDWWLWXGHZKLFKILWV6¶VHYLGHQFHDWW2WKHU
evidentialist views are possible as well. One could be an evidentialist about warrant, or epistemic 
obligation, or epistemic permission, or rationality and so on, where these epistemic properties 
might be distinguished from the property of epistemic justification. What all such views will 
share in common is that they say that the normative epistemic property in question is instantiated 
IRUVRPHVXEMHFWMXVWZKHQWKDWVXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFHLVUHODWHGDSSURSULDWHO\WRZKDWHYHUPLJKW
have the property. Where we are concerned with whether a certain belief-type or its content has 
the relevant property, these views will say that the belief-type or content has the property if and 
RQO\LIWKHVXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFHLVUHODWHGWRWKDWEHOLHI-type or content in a favorable way. 
Following Conee and Feldman,2 this is what I am calling the relation of evidential support²it is 
WKHUHODWLRQZKLFKREWDLQVEHWZHHQDSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFHDQGDEHOLHI-type or the content thereof 
just when, according to evidentialist theories, that belief-type or content has the property they are 
attempting to analyze.  
                                                          
1
 (DUO&RQHHDQG5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ³(YLGHQWLDOLVP´Philosophical Studies 41, 8 (1985): 15-34 and Earl Conee and 
Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
2
 (DUO&RQHHDQG5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ³(YLGHQFH´LQEpistemology: New Essays, ed.  Quentin Smith, 83-104 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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 Given this characterization of the evidential support relation, it is clear that this relation 
stands at the heart of evidentialist views. Accordingly, to better understand these views, we 
might ask: just when does DSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWDEHOLHIRULWVFRQWHQW",LQWHQGWRWDNHXS
this question at length in this section, arguing that a view which uses dispositions to explain 
evidential support remedies difficulties arguably faced by two leading rival views. But before 
doing so, I want to highlight two further features of the evidentialist views on which I am 
focusing. 
 The first feature concerns what these views say about the relata of the evidential support 
relation²that which does the supporting and that which is supported. While evidentialists have 
proposed a variety of accounts of what constitutes evidence including propositions,3 known 
propositions,4 true propositions,5 and mental states, a choice with respect to this matter will not 
affect the arguments I will offer in this paper. I shall for convenience follow Conee and Feldman 
in talking as if evidence consists in mental states.6 On the other side of the evidential support 
relation is what the evidence supports. Most evidentialists will prefer to think of what is 
VXSSRUWHGE\RQH¶VHYLGHQFHDVDEHOLHf-type or the propositional content thereof. For, only if this 
is so will the evidentialist be able to account for both the normative properties of type-attitudes 
when no token attitudes of their type is present and the normative properties of token attitudes.7 
                                                          
3
 Trent Dougherty, ³,Q'HIHQVHRID3URSRVLWLRQDO7KHRU\RI(YLGHQFH´LQEvidentialism and its Discontents, ed. 
Trent Dougherty, 347-59 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
4
 Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
5
 &OD\WRQ/LWWOHMRKQ³(YLGHQFHDQG.QRZOHGJH´Erkenntnis 74, 2 (2011): 241-62. 
6
 &RQHHDQG)HOGPDQ³(YLGHQFH´ 
7
 )RUDGHIHQVHRIWKLVFODLPVHH-RQDWKDQ.YDQYLJDQG&KULVWRSKHU0HQ]HO³7KH%DVLF1RWLRQRI-XVWLILFDWLRQ´
Philosophical Studies 59, 3 (1990): 235-)RUDYHULWDEOHZKR¶VZKRRIHSLVWHPRORJLVWVZKRKDYHHQGRUVHGWKLV
MXGJPHQWVHH-RKQ7XUUL³2QWKH5HODWLRQEHWZHHQ3URSRVLWLRQDODQG'R[DVWLF-XVWLILFDWLRQ´Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 80, 2 (2010): 312-26.   
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Choosing between whether what is supported is a belief-type or the propositional content thereof 
is less consequential. For, it is plausible that a belief-type has the relevant epistemic property just 
when its content does.8 For convenience ,ZLOOWDONDVLIZKDWLVVXSSRUWHGE\DSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFH
is a proposition.  
 The second feature of the evidentialist views I am focusing on is that they are all 
members of the dominant9 species of evidentialist views²internalist evidentialist views. 
According to internalist evidentialist views, whether a proposition is supported by a person S¶V 
evidence depends entirely on factors which are in a certain way internal to S. By contrast, 
externalist evidentialist views say that whether a proposition is supported by a person S¶V
evidence depends at least in part on factors which are not internal to S in this way. There have 
been two broad approaches offered by internalists for explaining what it is for a factor to be 
internal to an agent²accessibilism and mentalism.10 According to accessibilism, a factor is 
internal to a person S just in case it is accessible to S.11 According to mentalism, a factor is 
internal to a person S just in case it is mental.12 For convenience, I will talk in the sequel using 
the language of mentalism.  
To summarize, the species of evidentialist views in which I am interested in this paper are 
views according to which whether some proposition p has a normative epistemic property P for a 
                                                          
8
 Kvanvig and MHQ]HO³7KH%DVLF1RWLRQ´DGYRFDWHVWKLVYLHZ 
9
 See John Greco, Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) for an explanation for why this species dominates. 
10
 For an overview of WKHVHDOWHUQDWLYHVVHH*HRUJH3DSSDV³³,QWHUQDOLVWYV([WHUQDOLVW&RQFHSWLRQVRI(SLVWHPLF
-XVWLILFDWLRQ´LQStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified 2005, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/. 
11
 See, e.g., Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition (Englewood: Prentice-Hall, 1977) and Carl Ginet, 
Knowledge, Perception, and Memory (Dordrecht: D. Riedel, 1975).  
12
 See, e.g., Earl Conee DQG5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ³,QWHUQDOLVP'HIHQGHG´LQEpistemology: Internalism and 
Externalism, ed. Hilary Kornblith, 231-60 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).  
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SHUVRQ6GHSHQGVHQWLUHO\XSRQ6¶VHYLGHQFHDQGLWVUHODWLRQWRSZKHUHWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ6¶V
evidence and p is one which depends entirely upon mental facts about S. Applied to such views, 
the question in which I am interested in this section²the question of the evidential support 
relation²LVDTXHVWLRQDERXWZKHWKHUZHFDQFODULI\MXVWZKHQDSHUVRQ¶VPHQWDOVtates support a 
proposition p. 
 
1.2 A Dispositional Internalist Evidentialism 
 
I aim to defend a view of the internalist evidentialist species defined in 1.1 which explains the 
relation of evidential support using epistemic dispositions. I shall call the normative epistemic 
property with which my view is concerned epistemic justification. Following Feldman, I 
conceive of this property as a property of epistemic obligation.13 Thus, a proposition has the 
property of epistemic justification for a person just in case that person ought to believe it. The 
theory I offer explains epistemic justification partially in terms of the relation of evidential 
support. For any proposition p and any agent S, p has the property of epistemic justification for S 
(i.e., the belief-type believing p is justified for S) MXVWLQFDVH6¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVS,WIROORZV
from this that not-p has the property of epistemic justification for S (i.e., the belief-type believing 
not-p is justified for SMXVWLQFDVH6¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVQRt-p. Accordingly, the evidential 
support relation plays a very important role on my theory. 
 I propose to define the evidential support relation using epistemic dispositions. Epistemic 
dispositions are dispositions to take doxastic attitudes. The evidential support relation, I propose, 
can be understood in terms of just one such epistemic disposition²the disposition to believe.  In 
WKHFDVHZKHUHSLVVXSSRUWHGE\6¶VHYLGHQFH6KDVWKHGLVSRVLWLRQWREHOLHYHSZKHUHDVLQWKH
case where not-p is supported E\6¶VHYLGHQFH6KDVWKHGLVSRVLWLRQWREHOLHYHQRW-p. 
                                                          
13
 5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ³7KH(WKLFVRI%HOLHI´Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 3 (2000): 667-95. 
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 Following the standard line on dispositions, I shall say that dispositions have realization 
conditions and constitutive manifestations.14 The realization conditions of the dispositions which 
figure into my theory are aggregates of evidence, while the constitutive manifestations are 
doxastic attitudes. Since, as I said above, I shall speak of items of evidence as mental states, it 
follows that the realization conditions of the dispositions on my theory are aggregates of mental 
states. I will typically say that when a person is disposed to believe p and when the realization 
conditions for this disposition are some mental states M1-Mn, she is disposed to believe p in light 
of M1-Mn.15 With one qualification to be discussed at the end of section two below, I offer the 
following dispositional account of evidential support:  
'LVS(6)RUDOODJHQWV6DQGSURSRVLWLRQVS6¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVSLIDQGRQO\LI6LV
disposed to believe p in light RI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFH16 
StraightforwardlyLWIROORZVIURP'LVS(6WKDWDSHUVRQ6¶VHYLGHQFHZLOOVXSSRUWQRW-p if and 
only if S is disposed to believe not-SLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFH7KXVJLYHQP\FODLPVDERYH
about the relationship between evidential support and epistemic justification and obligation, it 
follows from DispES that S ought to believe p just in case S is disposed to believe p in light of 
6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFHDQGWKDW6RXJKWWREHOLHYHQRW-p just in case S is disposed to believe not-p in 
OLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFH 
 Now, whether or not a full theory of epistemic justification can be provided using my 
dispositionalist account of evidential support depends on whether there is a doxastic attitude of 
suspending judgment concerning p which is different from simply neither believing p nor 
                                                          
14
 5REHUW$XGL³'LVSRVLWLRQDO%HOLHIVDQG'LVSRVLWLRQVWR%HOLHYH´Nous 28 (1994): 419-34.   
15
 1RWHWKHQWKDWP\XVDJHRIEHOLHYLQJ³LQOLJKWRI´DUHDVRQGLIIHUVIURPWKDWRIVRPHRWKHUDXWKRUVVXFKDVWKDW
HPSOR\HGLQ(-RQDWKDQ/RZH³7KH:LOODVD5DWLRQDO)UHH3RZHU´LQPowers and Capacities in Philosophy: The 
New Aristotelianism, eds. R. Groff and J. Greco (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
16
 I do not include a temporal qualifier here for space-saving reasons, though I do wish to offer a synchronic account 
of evidential support with most evidentialists. See fn.42.  
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believing not-p. If there is no such attitude, then DispES can provide a full theory of epistemic 
justification. According to this theory, the only attitudes which are justified are beliefs, since 
disbeliefs and suspensions of judgment reduce to beliefs. A person S will be justified in believing 
DSURSRVLWLRQSMXVWZKHQ6LVGLVSRVHGWREHOLHYHSLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFHDSHUVRQ6ZLOO
be justified in believing not-p just when S is disposed to believe not-SLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDO
evidence; and, a person S will be justified in suspending judgment with respect to p just when S 
is neither disposed to believe p nor disposed to believe not-SLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFH 
 Following Jane Friedman, I favor the view that there is a distinct doxastic attitude of 
suspending judgment concerning p which is different from simply neither believing p nor 
believing not-p.17 And, given that there is such an attitude, I think it is false to claim that a person 
S is justified in suspending judgment with respect to p just when S is neither disposed to believe 
p nor disposed to believe not-p. Thus, given such a conception of suspension of judgment, I think 
that DispES can be used only to partially define an evidentialist view and cannot fully define 
one. My reason for thinking that DispES can be used only to partially define an evidentialist 
view given this conception of suspension of judgment is that, given this conception of 
suspension of judgment, I do not think a person ought to suspend judgment about claims she has 
never encountered and does not or would not understand. Rather, I think she ought to take no 
attitude toward such claims. But, if I used DispES to define when suspending judgment is 
justified in the way proposed above, then I would have to claim that in such cases a person ought 
to suspend judgment regarding the unencountered claims. Of course, this is not an approach to 
suspending judgment unique to my view. Other evidentialists may take this approach as well, 
using the relation of evidential support only to partially define their evidentialist views. They too 
                                                          
17
 -DQH)ULHGPDQ³6XVSHQGLQJ-XGJPHQW´Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 165-81. 
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will do so because they are dubious that suspending judgment concerning every claim p has their 
favored normative epistemic property for a person S wheneveU6¶VHYLGHQFHQHLWKHUVXSSRUWVS
nor supports not-p. Unencountered claims will be such that neither they nor their negations are 
VXSSRUWHGE\DSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFHEXWsuspending judgment concerning those claims do not have 
the relevant normative epistemic property for the person. 
 If my theory of evidential support cannot be used to fully define my evidentialist view, 
what else is needed? Simply an explanation of when suspension of judgment is justified. And, as 
it turns out, there is a theory of when suspension of judgment is justified which fits naturally with 
my above proposals for when belief and disbelief are justified. The theory is that suspending 
judgment concerning p is justified for a person S just when S¶VHYLGHQFHHLVFRXQWHUEDODQFHG
with respeFWWRSDQGWKDW6¶VHYLGHQFHHLVFRXQWHUEDODQFHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRSMXVWZKHQ6 is 
disposed in light of e to suspend judgment concerning p. With this theory of justified suspension 
of judgment in hand, I can provide the following, unified dispositional evidentialist account of 
the justificatory status of any doxastic attitude whatsoever:  
(DispEV) For all agents S and propositions p, doxastic attitude D toward p is justified for S if 
DQGRQO\LI6LVGLVSRVHGWRWDNH'WRZDUGSLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHnce. 
From DispEV, it follows that the attitude of belief is justified when the subject is disposed in 
light of all of her evidence to believe, that the attitude of disbelief is justified when the subject is 
disposed in light of all of her evidence to disbelieve, and that the attitude of suspension of 
judgment is justified just when the subject is disposed in light of all of her evidence to suspend 
judgment. DispEV gives us a full evidentialist theory which employs epistemic dispositions right 
at its center. 
 Before moving on, I briefly mention a potentially valuable feature of an account of 
support which, like the present account, employs dispositions at its center²a feature which, in 
9 
 
9 
 
my own case, attracted me to the view at the outset. The feature is that, arguably, such an 
account reaches rock bottom metaphysically in terms of accounting for evidential support. This 
is true, for example, if the so-called Neo-Aristotelian view that dispositions are not analyzable in 
terms of non-dispositions is correct. The growing popularity of such Neo-Aristotelianism is one 
further reason a reader may find the present account worthy of further investigation.18  
 
1.3 DispES and Alternative Leading Accounts of Evidential Support 
 
In 1.1, I explained what internalist evidentialist theories are and in 1.2 I articulated my own 
dispositional internalist evidentialist theory. But why should an internalist evidentialist prefer 
this theory to others? In the course of this paper I offer three reasons. The first reason comes in 
this section. I argue that the theory of evidential support espoused by my version of internalist 
evidentialism escapes unscathed from the kinds of objections which arguably face leading rival 
theories of evidential support that an internalist evidentialist might adopt. In the remainder of this 
section, I will explore two leading accounts of evidential support that internalist evidentialists 
have adopted, explain the kinds of problems such views arguably face, and show how my 
dispositional internalist evidentialism escapes these problems. There are other accounts of 
support that internalist evidentialists either have adopted or might adopt, but I will not engage 
them in the text because they are either less promising than the proposals discussed in the text or 
they are less clearly distinct from DispES.19 
                                                          
18
 See Greco and Gross, The New Aristotelianism.  
19
 Four such approaches are (i) to define evidential support in terms of epistemic principles [cf. Chisholm, Theory of 
Knowledge@LLWRGHILQHHYLGHQWLDOVXSSRUWXVLQJVXEMXQFWLYHFRQGLWLRQDOV>FI)UHG'UHWVNH³&RQFOXVLYHUHDVRQV´
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49, 1 (1971): 1-22], (iii) to define evidential support in terms of the supported 
FODLP¶VFRKHUHQFHZLWKWKHVXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFH>FI&,/HZLVAn Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle: 
Open Court, 1946)] and (iv) to define support using causal or explanatory rHODWLRQVUXQQLQJIURPWKHVXEMHFW¶V
evidence to non-GR[DVWLFPHQWDOVWDWHV>FI-RQDWKDQ0DWWKHVRQDQG-DVRQ5RJHUV³%HUJPDQQ¶V'LOHPPD([LW
6WUDWHJLHVIRU,QWHUQDOLVWV´Philosophical Studies 152 (2011): 55-80]. Approach (i) suffers from the problem that the 
principles themselves seem to cry out for a unified explanation [cf. John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of 
10 
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First, DispES is unscathed by those objections which seem to face promising 
explanationist accounts of evidential support. Explanationist views propose that we define 
evidential support in terms of the explanatory relationship or lack thereof between the 
SURSRVLWLRQSDQGWKHVXEMHFW6¶VHYLGHQFHH2QHVLPSOHSURSRVDODORQJWKHVHOLQHVLVDVIROORZV 
([S(66¶VHYLGHQFHHVXSSRUWVSLIISLVSDUWRIWKHEHVWJRRGH[SODQDWLRQIRUHDYDLODEOHWR620  
Recently, a view like ExpES have been defended by Conee and Feldman21 and similar views 
have also been championed by Moser, Harman, Lycan, and McCain.22  
 There are arguably two significant problems with such proposals²one with the necessity 
condition and one with the sufficiency condition. The problem with the necessity condition is 
WKDWLWFRQIOLFWVZLWKPDQ\FDVHVLQZKLFKDSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVDSURSRVLWLRQDERXWWKH
future.23 For example, I have argued that a golfer can be justified in believing that the ball he has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986)]; proponents of the accounts, including mine, discussed in 
the text typically hope to explain the true epistemic principles using their accounts. Approach (ii) is also less 
promising than the proposals in the text because the subjunctive conditionals employed in such theories are not 
necessarily true; but, given that they are not necessarily true, the accounts of support they would provide would 
conflict with internalism. Accounts of type (iii) tend to face a worry about circularity, as coherence is defined at 
least in part in terms of the support that components of a system give to other components [cf. Erik Olsson, 
³&RKHUHQWLVW7KHRULHVRI(SLVWHPLF-XVWLILFDWLRQ´,QStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, last 
modified 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/]. And, accounts of type (iv) are less clearly 
distLQFWIURP'LVS(6WKDQWKHDFFRXQWVGLVFXVVHGLQWKHWH[W)RUH[DPSOHWDONRIDSHUVRQ6¶VHYLGHQFHHH[SODLQLQJ
KHUVHHPLQJWKDWSPLJKWEHH[SODLQHGLQWHUPVRI6EHLQJGLVSRVHGLQOLJKWRI(WREHOLHYHS>FI75\DQ%\HUO\³,W
6HHPVOLNHWKHUHDUHQ¶W DQ\6HHPLQJV´Philosophia 40, 4 (2012): 771-82].  
20
 ,DGG³JRRG´KHUHEHFDXVHRIWKHSUREOHPRIWKHEDGORW&I9DOHULDQR,UDQ]R³%DG/RWV*RRG([SODQDWLRQV´
Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 33, 98 (2001): 71±96. 
21
 &RQHHDQG)HOGPDQ³(YLGHQFH´ 
22
 See Paul Moser, Knowledge and Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Gilbert Harman, 
Change in View (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), William Lycan, Judgment and Justification (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), and .HYLQ0F&DLQ³([SODQDWLRQLVW(YLGHQWLDOLVP´Episteme 10, 3 (2013): 
283-97. 
23
 $OYLQ*ROGPDQ³7RZDUGD6\QWKHVLVRI5HOLDELOLVPDQG(YLGHQWLDOLVP"2U(YLGHQWLDOLVP¶V3UREOHPV
5HOLDELOLVP¶V5HVFXH3DFNDJH´,QEvidentialism and its Discontents, ed. Trent Dougherty, 393-426 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011) urges a similar problem for introspectively justified beliefs, and Keith Lehrer, 
Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) offers a similar problem about mathematical beliefs. I think 
explanationist views are less vulnerable to these objections than to the one discussed in the text, but nonetheless 
'LVS(6FDQVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGO\DFFRXQWIRUWKHPDVZHOO.HYLQ0F&DLQ³([SODQDWLRQLVW(YLGHQWLDOLVP´FRQWDLQVD
reply to the examples from Lehrer and Goldman. 
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just putted will soon go in, even though the claim that the ball will go in does not explain why 
the golfer has the evidence he presently does.24  
 The problem with the sufficiency condition of ExpES is that it conflicts with certain cases 
ZKHUHGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWDSHUVRQ6¶VEHVWDYDLODEOHH[SODQDWLRQRIKHUHYLGHQFHHLVYHU\
good, she has good reason to believe that the correct explanation for e may well not be available. 
For example, a detective who is midway through her eight-step procedure for collecting evidence 
concerning a burglary may find that the best currently available explanation E of her evidence is 
a very good explanation of that evidence; but, it would be irresponsible of her to believe E, given 
that it has not been unusual in the past for relevant evidence to come up at later stages in her 
investigative procedure which was not explained by the best available explanations at this stage 
of inquiry. While E is the best available good explanation, believing E would be premature and 
VRDUJXDEO\(LVQRWVXSSRUWHGLQWKHHYLGHQWLDOLVW¶VVHQVHE\H 
 DispES does not conflict with these cases in the way that ExpES does. There is nothing 
strange in thinking that a golfer may be disposed in light of all of his evidence to believe a ball 
ZLOOUROOLQ7KXV'LVS(6FDQDFFRXQWIRUDJROIHU¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWLQJWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKLV
ball will roll in>. And, there is no reason to think that a good detective in the scenario described 
above would not be disposed to suspend judgment concerning the best available hypothesis, E. If 
VRWKHQ'LVS(6ZLOOQRWLPSO\WKDWVXFKDGHWHFWLYH¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWV( 
 Of course, one might worry that, despite the fact that DispES does not entail as ExpES 
GRHVWKDWRQH¶VEHVW available good explanation is always supported, it will nonetheless have 
untoward consequences in cases very much like the detective case as described above. For, while 
a detective need not be disposed to believe the best available explanation E of his evidence when 
                                                          
24
 75\DQ%\HUO\³([SODQDWLRQLVPDQG-XVWLILHG%HOLHIVDERXWWKH)XWXUH´Erkenntnis 78, 1 (2013): 229-43.  
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he is mid-way through his inquiry, he might be so disposed. In that case, DispES will imply that 
WKHGHWHFWLYH¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWV(DQGVRWKHGHWHFWLYHRXJKWWREHOLHYH($QGRQHPLJKWWKLQN
that this is not much better than the implication highlighted above for ExpES. I will address this 
kind of concern with DispES more fully in section three below. For now, let it suffice for me to 
foreshadow my response as follows. My view is not that a detective who is in fact so disposed 
ought not believe E, but rather that a detective who is so disposed has no business being a 
detective. This approach, as I will explain further below, is not unlike approaches leading 
evidentialists such as Feldman have offered in the face of similar objections to their views.25 
 Move away then from explanationist accounts and instead consider probabilistic accounts 
RIHYLGHQWLDOVXSSRUW:KHUHFLVWKHSURSRVLWLRQDOFRQWHQWRIDVXEMHFW6¶VHYLGHQFHHVXFK
accounts explain support as follows:  
3U(66¶VHYLGHQFHHVXSSRUWVSLII3USF !3US	3USFQ 
PrES explains evidential support in terms of two probabilistic claims, each of which deserves 
FRPPHQW7KHVHFRQGFODLP3USFQFODLPVWKDWLQRUGHUIRU6¶VHYLGHQFHHWRVXSSRUWSWKH
SUREDELOLW\RISJLYHQWKHFRQWHQWRI6¶s evidence must meet or exceed a certain threshold. This 
condition allows PrES to imply that a proposition either is supported or is not supported by a 
VXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFH6XFKan implication is likely to be attractive for evidentialist theories which 
seek to partially explain the presence of normative epistemic properties partially in terms of 
support, since such theories are likely to claim that these properties (e.g., epistemic obligation) 
are either possessed or not possessed. The first claim, Pr(p/c) > Pr(p) is important for handling 
FDVHVZKHUHDSURSRVLWLRQS¶VSUREDELOLW\LVQRWUDLVHGE\WKHFRQWHQWRIDVXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFH,Q
VXFKFDVHVLWLVQ¶WFOHDUWKDWDVXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFHZRXOGVXSSRUWWKHSURSRVLWLRQLQTXHVWLRQ 
                                                          
25
 6HH5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ³5HVSHFWLQJWKH(YLGHQFH´Philosophical Perspectives 19, 1 (2005): 95-119. 
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 Much of the complication in understanding PrES derives from the question of how to 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHVRUWRISUREDELOLW\UHSUHVHQWHGE\³3U´7KHUHDUHWZREURDGDSSURDFKHVWR
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ³3U´:HFDQXQGHUVWDQG³3U´LQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHSUREDELOLVWLFUHODWLRQVLW
represents are necessary or in such a way that these relations are not necessary. 
 First, consider views according to which the probabilistic relations are not necessary. 
According to such views, it is not the case that if Pr(p/c) = n, then necessarily Pr(p/c) = n. There 
are numerous, attractive interpretations of probability locutions according to which probabilistic 
relations are not necessary in precisely this way.26 %XWVXFKDQDSSURDFKWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³3U´
in PrES will not be attractive to internalists. For, recall that internalists claim that evidential 
VXSSRUWVXSHUYHQHVHQWLUHO\RQIDFWRUVLQWHUQDOWRDQDJHQW%XWLI³3U´LQ3U(6LVQRWDQHFHVVDU\
relation, then PrES permits there to be agents who are exactly alike internally but not exactly 
alike with respect to what their evidence supports. 
 Views according to which the probabilistic relations in PrES are necessary divide into 
two primary approaches which can be distinguished by the way they respond to a tempting 
objection to PrES. The objection is that PrES, when conjoined with evidentialist theses about 
normative epistemic properties, will imply that far more propositions have the normative 
epistemic properties in question than is in fact the case. In particular, they will imply that 
propositions have the relevant normative epistemic properties for a subject when the necessary 
probabilistic relation obtains whether or not the subject appreciates this probabilistic fact. But, as 
Conee and Feldman object³:KHUHWKLVSUREDELOLVWLFUHODWLRQLVEH\RQGWKHSHUVRQ¶V
                                                          
26
 This is so, e.g., of frequentist interpretations of probability [cf. John Venn, The Logic of Chance. 2nd ed. (London: 
Macmillan, 1876)], propensity interpretations [e.g., R. N. Giere³2EMHFWLYH6LQJOH-Case Probabilities and the 
)RXQGDWLRQVRI6WDWLVWLFV´LQLogic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. P. Suppes et al, 467-83 (New 
York: North-+ROODQGDQG.DUO3RSSHU³The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of Probability and the 
4XDQWXP7KHRU\´LQThe Colston Papers, ed. S. Körner, 9 (1957): 65±70], and nomological interpretations [cf. 
John Pollock, Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)].  
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understanding, the person may not be justified to any degree in believing a proposition made 
probable by the evidence´27 And the same may be said about other normative properties. 
 The first approach to responding to this objection to PrES appeals to epistemic bridge 
principles.28 According to such an approach, the right-hand side of PrES does not provide an 
account of evidential support as it figures into evidentialist theories in epistemology. Rather, it 
provides an account of the confirmation relation²a necessary relation which is the object of 
study in inductive logic. What is needed to achieve an account of support is a bridge principle to 
complete the following formula6¶VHYLGHQFHHZLWKFRQWHQWFVXSSRUWVSLII3USF!3US	
3USFQ	BBBBB The common approach to filling in this blank is to do so with some kind of 
epistemic UHODWLRQEHWZHHQ6DQG3USFVXFKDV6¶Vbelieving 3USF!3US	3USFQRU
LW¶V seeming to S that Pr(p/c) > Pr(p) 	3USFQ29 RU6¶Vbeing disposed to believe Pr(p/c) > 
Pr(p) & 3USFQ30 RU6¶Vbeing directly aware of Pr(p/c) > Pr(p) & 3USFQ.31 It is the 
addition of some such epistemic relation which helps to overcome the objection from Conee and 
Feldman. 
 Unfortunately, all such proposals arguably threaten to imply either WKDWQRERG\¶V
evidence ever supports a proposition or they threaten to imply that only the more sophisticated 
among us are such as to have evidence that supports a proposition. For example, the belief 
                                                          
27
 Conee and Feldman, ³(YLGHQFH´-5. Cf. also Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) and Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
28
 For a very helpful RYHUYLHZRIVXFKDSSURDFKHVVHH%UDQGHQ)LWHOVRQ³/RJLFDO)RXQGDWLRQVRI(YLGHQWLDO
6XSSRUW´Philosophy of Science 73 (2007): 500-12. 
29
 &I&KULV7XFNHU³0RYLQ¶RQ8S+LJKHU-/HYHO5HTXLUHPHQWVDQG,QIHUHQWLDO-XVWLILFDWLRQ´Philosophical 
Studies 157, 3 (2012): 323-40. 
30
 Cf. Swinburne, Epistemic Justification. 
31
 Cf. Richard Fumerton, Metaepistemology and Skepticism (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995). 
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proposal and the seeming proposal each require that the subject conceptualize the probabilistic 
claims in PrES in order for her evidence to support a proposition. The dispositional proposal 
UHTXLUHVWKDWLQRUGHUIRUDSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFHWRVXSSRUWDSURSRVLWLRQWKHUHPXVWEHD fact of the 
matter about how she is disposed to evaluate Pr(p/c). Arguably, though, these requirements are 
met only by the more sophisticated among us.32 The fourth proposal UHTXLUHVWKDWIRU6¶V
evidence with content c to support p, S is aware of a relation between c and p. But, in order to be 
aware of such a relation, there must be such a relation; and this is dubious, given that the 
relational facts are necessary.33 This sparseness of instances of support is unlikely to be attractive 
to evidentialists. 
 A second approach one might employ in order to defend PrES from the objection raised 
E\&RQHHDQG)HOGPDQLVWRH[SODLQ³3U´LQ3rES in terms of mental entities, such as the 
%D\HVLDQ¶VGHJUHHVRIEHOLHI On this Bayesian-inspired proposal, 3USIRU6LV6¶s degree of 
EHOLHILQSDQG3USFIRU6LV6¶Vconditional degree of belief in p given c. The Bayesian-
LQVSLUHGDSSURDFKWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ³3U´LQ3U(6HVFDSHVWKHGLIILFXOW\IRU3U(6KLJKOLJKWHGE\
Conee and Feldman, because, given that the probabilistic locutions in PrES are expliFDEOHDV6¶V
degree of belief, and given that agents are aware of their own mental lives, PrES will not imply 
that there will be propositions which have a positive normative status for agents where those 
agents have no appreciation of the probabilistic relation between their evidence and those 
propositions.  
                                                          
32
 Note, for example, the common rejection of conditional excluded middle. See Jonathan Bennett, A Philosophical 
Guide to Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
33
 See John Heil, The Universe as We Find It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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 The concern I wish to raise for the foregoing Bayesian-inspired approach centers on the 
notion of degrees of belief.34 One might think that talk of degrees of belief is just a way of 
talking about epistemic dispositions. To say that S has a high degree of belief in p conditional on 
c is just to say that S is strongly disposed to believe p given that S has evidence with content c. If 
this is how we understand degrees of belief, then the Bayesian approach will hardly differ from 
DispES.  
 The likely thing to be said to distinguish the Bayesian-inspired approach from DispES is 
that the Bayesian-LQVSLUHGDSSURDFKUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHUDWLRQDODJHQW¶VGHJUHHVRIEHOLHIREH\WKH
axioms of probability calculus.35 This has been a minimum requirement on Bayesian views 
historically.36 But, if the Bayesian-inspired approach is to make this requirement, then it will 
arguably reserve normative epistemic properties for too few of us. For, it is well-documented that 
RUGLQDU\HSLVWHPLFDJHQWV¶GHJUHHVRIEHOLHIDSSHDUWRUHJXODUO\YLRODWHWKHD[LRPVRISUREDELOLW\
theory in remarkable ways.37 Thus, to the extent that the Bayesian-inspired approach differs from 
DispES, it appears to offer a kind of support too sparse to be of interest to evidentialists. 
 DispES does not face the difficulties arguably faced by the probabilistic accounts of 
support surveyed above. As I will argue in further detail in section two, DispES does not conflict 
with internalism as do approaches to explaining PrES which interpret the probabilistic claims 
                                                          
34
 The traditional approach has been to analyze such using betting behavior, as in Bruno de FLQHWL³/D3UHYLVLRQVHV
ORLVORJLTXHVVHVRXUFHVVXEMHFWLYHV´WUDQVODWHGDQGUHSULQWHGLQStudies in Subjective Probability, ed. Kuyberg and 
Smokler (Huntington, NY: Krieger 1980), though there remains controversy about this. For an overview, see Franz 
Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Degrees of Belief (Springer, 2010). 
35
 This is the approach sometimes called probabilism6HH$ODQ+iMHN³$UJXPHQWVIRU²or Against²3UREDELOLVP"´
British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 59 (2008): 793-819. 
36
 See discXVVLRQLQ$ODQ+iMHN³,QWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI3UREDELOLW\´LQStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, last modified 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ probability-interpret/.  
37
 See D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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therein as contingent, because DispES does not permit subjects who are exactly alike mentally to 
differ with respect to what their evidence supports. Nor does DispES imply that at best only the 
more sophisticated among us can have evidence that supports a proposition, as the accounts 
above which appealed to epistemic bridge principles threatened to do. For, even the less 
sophisticated among us are disposed to believe claims in light of our total evidence. Finally, as 
we saw when discussing problems for explanationism, DispES is far from implying that only 
ideal agents can have normative epistemic properties; and so it will not face the difficulty 
arguably faced by Bayesian-inspired views.  
A brief comparison of DispES to promising explanationist and probabilistic accounts of 
support suggests that DispES may well have significant advantages over these accounts. This is 
one reason for an internalist evidentialist to be attracted to DispES. In the next two sections, I 
discuss two additional reasons.   
 
2. Dispositional Evidentialism and the Problem of Forgotten Evidence 
 
In this section, I aim to show that the dispositionalist account of evidential support I articulated 
in the previous section, DispES, has a second valuable feature to offer internalist evidentialists. It 
can help evidentialists respond to what is one of the most persistent and difficult objections to 
evidentialist views²the problem of forgotten evidence. I begin with an explanation of this 
problem, then discuss difficulties facing leading approaches to responding to the problem on 
behalf of evidentialists, then show that DispES can help the evidentialist respond to the problem 
without facing these difficulties. 
While the problem of forgotten evidence can be presented as a challenge for an 
evidentialist theory of any normative epistemic property, I shall present it here as a problem for 
an evidentialist theory of epistemic justification. Briefly stated, the problem of forgotten 
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evidence is the following. There appear to be cases where a person has a belief which we have 
both intuitive pull and theoretical reason to count as fully justified, but where the person who 
hosts this belief has lost all of her evidence concerning this belief. Such beliefs, if they exist, 
make trouble for internalist evidentialist theories. For, these theories say that whether a belief is 
justified is determined by the evidence the subject has. But if there are such beliefs then they 
represent cases where a belief is justified but this justification is not determined by the evidence 
the subject has, since the subject has no evidence for this belief. 
A concrete example will help. All of us have stored dispositional beliefs about our social 
security numbers. These are beliefs we have to which we attend every so often when necessary.38 
For most of us, we formed these beliefs long ago on the basis of some evidence which we have 
long since forgotten. Imagine that Joe formed a belief long ago that his social security number is 
890-23-5762 and that he GRHVQ¶WUHPHPEHUKRZKHOHDUQHGWKLVDQ\PRUHMoreover, imagine 
that hHKDVQ¶WORRNHGDWKLVVRFLDOVHFXULW\FDUGDQ\WLPHUHFHQWO\DQGVRKDVQRPHPRULHVRI
having seen this number on his card. It would be tempting to say that Joe GRHVQ¶WFXUUHQWO\KDYH
any evidence for his belief that his social security number is 890-23-5762. Of course, if Joe 
GRHVQ¶WKDYHDQ\HYLGHQFHIRUWKLVEHOLHIWKHQDFFRUGLQJWRHYLGHQWLDOLVPKHZLOOQRWEHMXVWLILHG
in holding this belief.  
But, unfortunately for the evidentialist, there is both intuitive and theoretical pressure to 
accept that Joe¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHOLHILVMXVWLILHG7KHLQWXLWLYHSUHVVXUHZLOOEHHVSHFLDOO\
powerful for someone who is strongly inclined to deny skepticism about justification. People 
who are inclined to think we do have quite many justified beliefs are likely to tKLQNWKDW-RH¶V
social security belief is among them.  7KHRUHWLFDOSUHVVXUHWRDFFHSWWKDW-RH¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\
                                                          
38
 ,PHDQWRIROORZ$XGL³'LVSRVLWLRQDO%HOLHIV´DQGRWKHUVLQGLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQGLVSRVLWLRQDOEHOLHIVDQG
dispositions to believe. Dispositional beliefs are beliefs, while dispositions to believe are dispositions, not beliefs.  
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belief is justified can be applied by appealing to the principle of inferential justification. This 
principle says that only justified beliefs can contribute to the justificatory status of other 
beliefs.39 GLYHQWKLVSULQFLSOHLI-RH¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHOLHILVQRWMXVWLILHGWKHQLWFDQQRW
FRQWULEXWHWRWKHMXVWLILFDWRU\VWDWXVRIRWKHUMXVWLILHGEHOLHIVRIKLV%XWLWVHHPVFOHDUWKDW-RH¶V
social security belief can contribute to the justificatory status of others of his beliefs. For 
LQVWDQFHLIVRPHRQHVD\KLVEDQNHUDVNHG-RH³:KDWDUHWKHPLGGOHWZRGLJLWVRI\RXUVRFLDO
VHFXULW\QXPEHU"´-RHPLJKWIRUPDEHOLHIDERXWWKLVE\LQIHUHQFHfrom his belief about his total 
VHFXULW\QXPEHU+HPLJKWWKLQNWRKLPVHOILQUHVSRQVHWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³:HOOP\VRFLDOVHFXULW\
number is 890-«2KLW¶V´,WLVTXLWHSODXVLEOHWRWKLQNWKDW-RH¶VEHOLHIDERXWWKHPLGGOH
two digits of his social security number is a justified belief the justification of which is partly 
explained by his belief about his full social security number. But, given the principle of 
inferential justification, it follows that his belief about his full social security number must be 
justified as well.  
 6RWKHUHLVLQWXLWLYHDQGWKHRUHWLFDOSUHVVXUHWRDFFHSWWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDW-RH¶VVRFLDO
security belief is justified. But it is difficult to see how an evidentialist could maintain that it is. 
Below, I will discuss three common approaches evidentialists have used to respond to the 
problem of forgotten evidence. I argue that each approach faces a significant difficulty, but that 
the evidentialist who adopts DispES can respond to the problem of forgotten evidence without 
her view facing these difficulties.  
The first response is to advocate a strategy discussed by Matthew McGrath according to 
which significant occurrent phenomenology has been overlooked in the presentation of cases of 
forgotten evidence, and that this phenomenology is the evidence the subjects in those cases have 
                                                          
39
 See Fumerton, Metaepistemology.  
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for their beliefs.40 For instance, in our example with Joe, the evidentialist may suggest that the 
belief is justified only if it comes to him as something he knows or remembers. Or, the 
evidentialist might ask whether it seems to Joe that his social security number is 890-23-5762, or 
whether he seems to remember this. Such seemings, the evidentialist may argue, are distinct 
IURP-RH¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHOLHILWVHOI41 and they are the sort of evidence which could support 
this belief.  
As McGrath points out, the central difficulty facing this defense of evidentialism is that it 
simply is not plausible that in all cases where there is intuitive and theoretical reason to consider 
a belief for which a subject has forgotten her evidence justified she has the kind of occurrent 
phenomenology discussed here. It is of course true that sometimes when someone continues 
holding a memorial belief about her social security number it also seems to her that this belief is 
true, or one of the other kinds of phenomena above accompanies this belief. This may be 
especially so where the memorial belief is occurrently held or attended to. But it is extremely 
implausible that in every such case there is such accompanying phenomenology. Especially in 
cases where the belief does not plan a role in an instance of reasoning, where it remains in the 
background unattended to by the subject, such phenomenology is unlikely to be present.   
A second approach is for the evidentialist to appeal to epistemic conservatism. According 
WRHSLVWHPLFFRQVHUYDWLVPDVXEMHFW¶VEHOLHYLQJDSURSRVLWLRQSFRQIHUVVRPHSRVLWLYHHSLVWHPLF
status on the proposition p for her.42 One version of epistemic conservatism would say the 
                                                          
40
 0DWWKHZ0F*UDWK³0HPRU\DQG(SLVWHPLF&RQVHUYDWLVP´Synthese 151, 1 (2007): 1-24.   
41
 For arguments that seemings are not just beliefs, see Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001) and Matheson and Rogers³%HUJPDQQ¶V'LOHPPD´ 
42
 Jonathan Kvanvig³&RQVHUYDWLVPDQGLWV9LUWXHV´Synthese 71, 1 (1989): 143-63, Hamid Vahid³9DULHWLHVRI
(SLVWHPLF&RQVHUYDWLVP´Synthese 141,1 (2004): 97-122, and Kevin McCain³7KH9LUWXHVRI(SLVWHPLF
&RQVHUYDWLVP´Synthese 164, 2 (2008): 185-200 each defend such a version of conservatism. McGrath³0HPRU\´ 
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following: if believing p FRKHUHVZLWKDVXEMHFW6¶VRWKHUHYLGHQFHDQG6LQIDFWGRHVEHOLHYHS
then p is justified. An evidentialist might make use of epistemic conservatism by arguing that the 
reason believing p contributes to the epistemic status of the proposition p is that believing p is 
evidence for p. This evidentialist could then use this fact to respond to the problem of forgotten 
HYLGHQFH,WLVQ¶WVRPHother evidence that subjects in such cases have which justifies the beliefs 
for which they have forgotten their evidence; rather, it is these beliefs themselves. The evidence 
Joe has which justifies his believing that his social security number is 890-23-LV-RH¶VEHOLHI
that this is his number.  
The primary difficulty I will highlight for this response to the problem of forgotten 
evidence is that the kind of epistemic conservatism required here is simply too strong. This is 
especially clear if we conceive of epistemic justification in the way I proposed above as 
HTXLYDOHQWWRHSLVWHPLFREOLJDWLRQ)RULWLVQ¶WWKHFase that when one believes a proposition 
which coheres with her other evidence she ought to have done this. Think for instance about 
ZKHWKHUEHOLHYLQJDWKHRU\ZKHUHRWKHUVFRKHUHHTXDOO\ZHOOZLWKRQH¶VGDWDLVREOLJDWRU\43 
This may help to explain why those who have defended epistemic conservatism have typically 
defended it for some property falling short of epistemic justification.44 Retreating to the position 
WKDWWKH-RH¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHOLHIKDVRQO\VRPHOHVVHUHSLVWHPLFVWDWXVIDOOLQJVKRUWRI
epistemic justification is an option for the evidentialist, but it is not an attractive one. For, it 
would seem that the typical agent is about as well-positioned epistemically with respect to her 
social security number as she is with respect to any claim. Adopting the epistemic conservatism 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
defends a diachronic version of conservatism. But, I will not consider it in the text because the evidentialists with 
whom I hope to dialogue are interested in offering synchronic analyses of normative epistemic properties. 
43
 Vahid³9DULHWLHV´ develops this example. 
44
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approach to responding to the problem forgotten evidence, then, threatens to saddle the 
evidentialist with a strong skepticism about justification.  
 Consider one final proposal, recently advocated by Conee and Feldman.45 The proposal is 
similar to the first proposal in that it appeals to phenomenology which is typically overlooked in 
FDVHVVXFKDVWKDWRI-RH¶VVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHOLHI+RZHYHULQVWHDGRISURSRVLQJWKDW-RHKDVDQ
occurrent seeming that his social security number is 890-23-5762 or that this belief occurrently 
comes to Joe as something he knows, the proposal is instead that Joe is disposed to have this 
phenomenology. Joe is disposed to have a seeming that his social security number is 890-23-
5762 or Joe is disposed for his belief that his social security number is 890-23-5762 to come to 
KLPDVVRPHWKLQJKHNQRZV$QGWKHVHGLVSRVLWLRQDOVWDWHVFRQVWLWXWH-RH¶VHYLGHQFHZKLFK
supports the claim that his social security number is 890-23-5762. 
 One concern with such a proposal is whether it is consistent with internalism. After all, 
dispositions to take doxastic attitudes have typically figured into externalist theories in 
epistemology, rather than internalist ones.46 But, I agree with Conee and Feldman that an 
internalist can help herself to these states. For, such states do seem to make a contribution to 
what a subject is like mentally. If Alice has an experience as of seeing smoke rising over a 
mountain but no disposition in the presence of such experiences to believe that there is a fire, and 
John has both an experience as of seeing smoke rising over a mountain as well as a disposition in 
the presence of such experiences to believe that there is a fire, then it is plausible that Alice and 
John are not exactly alike mentally.  
                                                          
45
 Earl Conee and 5LFKDUG)HOGPDQ³$G*ROGPDQ´LQEvidentialism and its Discontents, ed. Trent Dougherty, 463-
9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
46
 For example, Greco, Achieving Knowledge and Ernest Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective 
Knowledge, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) each have dispositions play a key role in their theories, 
and they are paradigmatic externalists. 
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 But I do wish to urge a dilemma against the present proposal nonetheless. Suppose that 
WKHSURSRVHGGLVSRVLWLRQZKLFKMXVWLILHV-RH¶VEHOLHILVDGLVSRVLWLRQWRKDYHDVHHPLQJWKDW-RH¶V
social security number is 890-23-5762. Either the realization conditions of this disposition 
LQFOXGH-RH¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFHRUWKH\GRQ¶W%XWLIWKH\GRLQFOXGHKLVWRWDOHYLGHQFHWKHQRQH
ZRQGHUVZK\KHZRXOGQ¶WKDYHDQRFFXUUHQWVHHPLQJWKDWKLVVRFLDOVHFXULW\QXPEHULV890-23-
5762, something we supposed previously that he might not have. To be clear, I am not claiming 
that, necessarily, if S has a disposition to take some doxastic attitude D and the realization 
conditions of this disposition are satisfied, then S takes D. For, following E. Jonathan Lowe, I 
think it is possible for a person to exercise an executive will to refrain from believing when she is 
consciously attending to her evidence and dispositions.47 But, of course, here we are imagining a 
case where Joe is not consciously attending to his disposition to seem that his social security 
number is 890-23-5762. 7KXVLIWKHDGYRFDWHRIWKHSUHVHQWVROXWLRQLVWRPDLQWDLQWKDW-RH¶V
disposition does LQFOXGHDPRQJLWVUHDOL]DWLRQFRQGLWLRQV-RH¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFHVKHRZHVXVDQ
explanation for why Joe does not occurrenty have a seeming that his social security number is 
890-23-5762. And it is quite difficult to see what sort of explanation she can offer. 
 7KLQJVDUHQREHWWHURQWKHRWKHUKRUQRIWKHGLOHPPD)RUVXSSRVHWKDW-RH¶VWRWDO
evidence is not among the realization conditions of his disposition to have a seeming that his 
social security number is 890-23-5762. In that case, one wonders how his having this disposition 
could show that his total evidence supports the claim that his social security number is 890-23-
5762. $IWHUDOOZKHQRQHLVGLVSRVHGWREHOLHYHDFODLPLQOLJKWRIRQO\SDUWRIRQH¶VHYLGHQFH
EXWQRWDOORIRQH¶VHYLGHQFHLWVHHPV LPSODXVLEOHWRFODLPWKDWRQH¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVWKH
claim in question. Similarly, it is implausible to claim that when one is disposed to have a 
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VHHPLQJWKDWSLQOLJKWRIPHUHO\SDUWRIRQH¶VHYLGHQFHRQH¶Vtotal evidence thereby supports 
this claim.  
 If the foregoing responses were the only responses available to evidentialists in the face 
of the problem of forgotten evidence, then their view would be precarious indeed. Fortunately, 
DispES provides evidentialists with an alternative response to the problem which faces none of 
the difficulties faced by the foregoing proposals. For, the advocate of DispES can propose that in 
those cases used to present the problem of forgotten evidence, the subjects are disposed to 
believe the claims in question in light of their total evidence. For example, she can propose that 
Joe is disposed to believe that his social security number is 890-23-5762 in light of all his 
evidence. This claim is indeed quite plausible, since it helps to explain why Joe maintains his 
belief that his social security number is 890-23-5762 under a wide variety of circumstances. But, 
so long as Joe is disposed to believe that his social security number is 890-23-5762 in light of all 
RIKLVHYLGHQFH'LVS(6LPSOLHVWKDW-RH¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRrts this belief. And, so, DispES can be 
XVHGE\DQDGYRFDWHRIDQHYLGHQWLDOLVWWKHRU\RIHSLVWHPLFMXVWLILFDWLRQWRDUJXHWKDW-RH¶VEHOLHI
that his social security number is 890-23-5762 is justified.  
 Let me briefly explain why this response does not face the difficulties of the three 
foregoing responses. First, it does not face the difficulty of the response invoking neglected 
occurrent phenomenology because it does not invoke such phenomenology. Second, the response 
based on DispES does not face the difficulty faced by the last response above invoking 
dispositions to have phenomenology like that proposed by the first strategy. It is true that the 
strategy invoking DispES appeals to a disposition whose realization conditions include all of 
-RH¶VHYLGHQFH, as would be true on the third strategy above if it took the first horn of the 
GLOHPPD,SURSRVHG%XWWKHDGYRFDWHRIWKHVWUDWHJ\LQYRNLQJ'LVS(6QHHGQ¶WH[SODLQZK\WKH
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manifestation of the disposition she cites is absent. For, the manifestation of that disposition is 
present!  
 The comparison between DispES and epistemic conservatism is the most delicate. At first 
glance, it may seem that DispES will imply, just as much as epistemic conservatism does, that 
ZKHQDSURSRVLWLRQSFRKHUHVZLWKDSHUVRQ6¶s evidence and S believes p, S is justified in 
believing p. For, plausibly, S will not believe p without being at least somewhat disposed to 
EHOLHYHSLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFH7KXVLQVRIDUDVLWLVDZRUU\IRUHSLVWHPLFFRQVHUYDWLVP
to imply that subjects in such cases are justified in believing as they do, the same worry will 
threaten DispES. But it is worth noting that the advocate of DispES has an option of responding 
to this worry that the advocate of epistemic conservatism does not appear to have. For, she can 
propose a slight modification to DispES which requires that the believer not simply be disposed 
to some extent to believe p for her evidence to support p, but that she be disposed with a degree 
of strength meeting at least a certain threshold to believe p for her evidence to support p. 
Accordingly, we can propose the following strong dispositional account of evidential support: 
(Strong DispES) )RUDOODJHQWV6DQGSURSRVLWLRQVS6¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVSLIDQGRQO\LI6
is sufficiently strongly GLVSRVHGWREHOLHYHSLQOLJKWRI6¶VWRWDOHYLGHQFH 
Strong DispES will have the consequence that where a person is faced with multiple theories 
which cohere with her evidence and she believes one, she will not thereby be justified in 
believing the one she believes. For, a person can be in such a position without it being the case 
that she is strongly disposed to believe the proposition in question. Thus, epistemic conservatism 
implies, while Strong DipsES does not, that if a proposition p coheres witKDSHUVRQ6¶VHYLGHQFH
and S believes p, then S is justified in believing p.  
In addition to allowing the dispositional evidentialist to maintain this advantage over 
epistemic conservatism, there are at least two further motivations favoring a move from DispES 
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to Strong DispES. The move, in other words, is not ad hoc. First, moving to Strong DispES will 
provide the dispositional evidentialist with resources with which she can mimic what 
probabilistic accounts of support are able to do in terms of offering a graded account of support. 
For, like such accounts, she can provide an account of degrees of support, including an account 
of that degree of support required for justification. Whereas probabilistic accounts do this with a 
numeric measure, the advocate of Strong DispES does it with a measure of dispositional 
strength. The second motivation for moving from DispES to Strong DispES is that doing so 
offers the dispositional evidentialist resources for accounting for certain apparent 
counterexamples to her view, such as cases of persistent cognitive illusions and persistent 
FRJQLWLYHELDVHV7KHVHZLOOEHFDVHVZKHUHDVXEMHFW¶VGLVSRVLWLRQWREHOLHYHVRPHFODLPS
persists even after she has become convinced that not-p. For example, it is arguably the case that 
in the Muller-Lyer example the subject retains a disposition to believe the lines unequal even 
after becoming firmly convinced they are equal. One way to account for such examples is to 
claim that while the subject may have some disposition to believe that the lines are unequal, she 
is more strongly disposed to believe them equal.48 Indeed, treating these cases in this way 
significantly parallels what others have said about varying strengths of dispositions in other 
contexts. Consider, for example, Stephen MumforG¶V discussion of why soaSEXEEOHVGRQ¶WUROO 
³,IZHWDNHWKHVKDSHRIEHLQJVSKHULFDOZHFDQVHHWKDWDQ\REMHFWEHDULQJWKHSURSHUW\
will . . . be disposed to roll in a straight line down an inclined plane. . . . Some have 
offered counterexamples . . . Lowe, for instance, has said (in discussion) that a soap 
EXEEOHLVVSKHULFDOEXWZLOOQRWUROOGRZQDQLQFOLQHGSODQH/RZH¶VFDVHIDLOVIRU
DQRWKHUUHDVRQ7KHVSKHULFDOVRDSEXEEOHLVLQGHHGGLVSRVHGWRUROOEXWLWGRHVQ¶WGRVR
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 Another approach to cases of persistent cognitive illusions would be to claim that in such cases the subject is only 
disposed to believe the unsupported claim in light of some proper subpart of her evidence and not in light of all of it.  
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because it also possesses a countervailing power of stickiness. The stickiness is stronger 
than the power to roll´49  
Just as the soap bubble can have a disposition to roll but an even stronger disposition to not roll, 
a person can have a disposition to believe a claim p but an even stronger disposition to believe 
not-p; and, an advocate of Strong DispES can appeal to this fact in order to account for cases of 
persistent cognitive illusions and biases. 
As Strong DispES retains the advantages of DispES over both rival accounts of support 
discussed in 1.1 and as it holds advantages over rival solutions to the problem of forgotten 
evidence discussed here, I conclude that there are now two significant reasons for an internalist 
evidentialist to be attracted to Strong DispES. 
 
3. Dispositional Evidentialism and Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology 
 
In the previous two sections, I have argued that Strong DispES has two attractive features from 
the perspective of internalist evidentialism. It provides an account of evidential support which 
escapes problems faced by leading competing accounts of support, and it makes available a 
response to the problem of forgotten evidence which escapes difficulties faced by alternative 
responses available to evidentialists. Nonetheless, I must address the question of whether DispES 
escapes the difficulties of these other views only at far too high a cost. Specifically, I must 
address the concern briefly alluded to in section one about whether DispES escapes these 
difficulties only by making evidential support far too easy to come by. That concern, again, was 
that Strong DispES implies that just any sufficiently strong disposition in light of total evidence 
to believe a proposition, no matter how funky, can account for the presence of epistemic 
justification. For example, if a detective who had completed half of his regular steps through an 
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investigation was sufficiently strongly disposed in light of his total evidence to believe that the 
best current suspect FRPPLWWHGWKHFULPHWKHQ6WURQJ'LVS(6LPSOLHVWKDWWKLVGHWHFWLYH¶V
evidence supports the proposition that this suspect did it. Similarly, in a case where multiple 
WKHRULHVFRKHUHHTXDOO\ZHOOZLWKDVXEMHFW¶VHYLGHQFHLIWKLVVXEMHFWLVVWURQJO\GLVSRsed to 
believe one of these theories Strong DispES will imply that her evidence supports believing that 
theory.  
 In this section, I aim to propose a synthesis of Strong DispES and Virtue Epistemology 
which is at once a response to the foregoing concern and a third positive reason to favor Strong 
DispES over its rivals. The synthesis constitutes a response to the foregoing concern because it 
explains away the appearance of a worrisome consequence for Strong DispES. The synthesis 
constitutes a positive reason to prefer Strong DispES to its rivals because as Baehr has argued, a 
synthesis of evidentialism and virtue epistemology is desirable in itself;50 and, Strong DispES 
makes possible a synthesis which improves upon the leading synthesis of these views proposed 
to date.  
 ,¶OOVWDUWZLWKP\RZQSURSRVDO7KHV\QWKHVLV,SURSRVHLVHPEHGGHGZLWKLQZKDW,ZLOO
call an Aristotelian theory of epistemic value. According to this theory, what is epistemically 
YDOXDEOHFDQEHH[SODLQHGE\DEHOLHYHU¶VSHUIRUPLQJKHUSroper function and doing so with 
excellence. Following Feldman,SURSRVHWKDWWKHHSLVWHPLF³RXJKW´RIHSLVWHPLFMXVWLILFDWLRQLV
a role-ought.51 In other words, it specifies what it is for a believer to perform her proper function 
as a believer. It is preFLVHO\VXFKDVHQVHRI³RXJKW´WKDW,EHOLHYH6WURQJ'LVS(6KHOSVWKH
evidentialist to clarify. For the role of a believer is to form beliefs in response to her 
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environment. And, she does this by believing what she is strongly disposed to believe in light of 
her total evidence. This is what believers do that non-EHOLHYHUVGRQ¶WGR 
 %XWIXOILOOLQJRQH¶VSURSHUIXQFWLRQLVQRWDOOWKHUHLVWROLYLQJZHOODVDQHSLVWHPLFDJHQW
)RULWLVRQHWKLQJWRIXOILOORQH¶VSURSHUIXQFWLRQDQGDQRWKHUWKLQJWRIXOILOl that function with 
excellence,WPDWWHUVQRWWRZKHWKHURQHIXOILOOVRQH¶VIXQFWLRQDVDEHOLHYHUSUHFLVHO\ZKDWRQH¶V
HSLVWHPLFGLVSRVLWLRQVDUHEXWLWPDWWHUVPXFKWRZKHWKHURQHIXOILOOVRQH¶VIXQFWLRQDVD
believer with excellence what those epistemic dispositions are. A believer who believes in 
accordance with funky epistemic dispositions may believe precisely what she ought to believe, 
given that she has those dispositions; but, she is still missing out on something valuable 
epistemically precisely because she has those dispositions rather than others. 
I propose that we synthesize the proposed evidentialist account of epistemic justification 
from part one with a virtue theory of flourishing as an epistemic agent. We can do so in the 
following way. Using the resources of the proposal in part one above, we can provide a full 
WKHRU\RIZKDWLWLVWRIXOILOORQH¶VIXQFWLRQDVDEHOLHYHU²to take all and only those attitudes one 
ought to take. That theory is Strong DispPF:  
(Strong DispPF)  A person S fulfills her proper function as a believer to the extent that she 
takes all and only those doxastic attitudes which she is sufficiently strongly disposed to take 
in light of all of her evidence.   
This theory can be complemented by a virtue-based account of what it is for a believer to fulfill 
her proper function as a believer with excellence. That account is VirtPFE: 
(VirtPFE) A person S fulfills her proper function as a believer with excellence to the extent 
that she takes all and only those doxastic attitudes which she is sufficiently strongly disposed 
to take by virtuous dispositions in light of all of her evidence.   
Both the person who merely fulfills her proper function as a believer and the person who fulfills 
that function with excellence take all and only those attitudes they ought to take given the way 
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that they are; but, the person who fulfills his proper function with excellence is a better way than 
the person who merely fulfills his proper function. The difference lies in the value of the 
dispositions in accordance with which each forms his attitudes. 
 Certainly more deserves to be said about the proposed synthesis. For example, the notion 
of virtuous dispositions needs to be spelled out carefully. While I will not defend any particular 
theory of virtuous dispositions here, I do briefly note that there is an important constraint that 
must be met by such a theory if it is to be attractive from the perspective of an advocate of the 
Aristotelian synthesis above. Namely, the theory must explain what it is that makes the virtuous 
dispositions virtuous without simply claiming that they are virtuous because they guide the 
believer toward believing what her evidence supports. This is an important constraint because, 
given Strong DispPF and VirtPFE, an explanation of the virtuousness of virtuous dispositions 
WKDWYLRODWHVLWZLOO\LHOGWKHUHVXOWWKDWWKHUHLVQRGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQIXOILOOLQJRQH¶VSURSHU
function as a believer and fulfilling that function with excellence²something an advocate of the 
Aristotelian synthesis will not want to accept. Thankfully, there are available explanations of the 
virtuousness of virtuous dispositions which do not appeal to evidential support in this way, 
including explanations that are available to internalists.52 Such theories, or theories inspired by 
them, might be profitably pursued by an advocate of the proposed synthesis.  
While there is undoubtedly more to say about the details of the Aristotelian synthesis 
above, including the notion of virtuous dispositions, I propose that enough has been said to 
accomplish my two central aims in this section. Those aims were to show that, given the 
proposed synthesis, Strong DispES can escape from the problem of funky dispositions and to 
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show that the proposed synthesis is superior to the leading proposed synthesis of its kind 
currently on offer.  
First, let me explain how the proposed synthesis enables the advocate of Strong DispES 
to account for cases involving funky dispositions. These are cases where a person with funky 
dispositions believes in accordance with them. DispES predicts that what she believes is what 
she ought to believe. But, we are inclined to believe that this prediction is mistaken, because 
there is obviously something amiss about her believing as she does. Given the proposed 
synthesis, there is something amiss about her believing as she does. But what is amiss is not that 
she has believed what she ought not believe. Rather, what is amiss is that she has believed in 
accordance with non-virtuous, perhaps even vicious, dispositions. In the detective example, for 
instance, I claim that the detective who is in fact strongly disposed to believe that the best current 
suspect committed the crime ought to believe this. This is what Strong DispES implies. But I 
claim that such a person is a no-good detective. He fails to fulfill his proper function as a 
believer, and as a detective, with excellence. 
This response is actually rather similar to a response commonly offered by evidentialists 
against a similar problem raised against their views. Baehr DUJXHVDJDLQVW&RQHH¶VDQG
)HOGPDQ¶VHYLGHQWLDOLVWYLHZRIHSLVWHPLFMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUH[DPSOHWKDWLWLPSOLHVWKDWSHUVRQV
who inquire irresponsibly can have justified beliefs, since they may very well believe in 
accordance with what the evidence which they have irresponsibly gathered supports.53 In 
response to such examples, evidentialists such as Feldman have typically dug in their heels, 
insisting that, given that a person has inquired in this way, he very well ought to believe what his 
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evidence supports.54 It may be that there is something negative we should say about such a 
SHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHUEXWQRWDERXWKLVEHOLHIV0\SURSRVHGV\QWKHVLVRIHYLGHQWLDOLVPDQGYLUWXH
epistemology responds in like manner to the problem of funky dispositions. I propose that, given 
that a person has such dispositions, there is a sense²a sense captured by Strong DispPF²in 
which what she ought to do is believe in accordance with them. But, at the same time, I propose 
that there is some kind of epistemic value that she lacks. This value is accounted for by VirtPF.  
,¶PQRWFODLPLQJKHUHWKDWWKHUHVSRQVH,RIIHUWRWKHFDVHRIIXQN\GLVSRVLWLRQVLVRQLWV
own just as plausible as the response of Feldman to cases of irresponsible evidence gathering or 
even that it is clearly satisfactory. Rather, I am noting that there is a significant parallel between 
the responses and that, given the attractiveness of Strong DispES displayed already in this paper, 
retaining it and responding in this way to the problem of funky dispositions may be the best 
available option for the evidentialist. Moreover, since, as we saw in section two, evidentialists 
such as Conee and Feldman are already prepared to grant that epistemic dispositions may serve 
as unjustified justifiers, if they wish to resist my proposal and claim that funky dispositions 
cannot serve as such, they need an explanation for why they cannot which coheres well with 
their general epistemology. I propose, though, that such an explanation will be difficult to come 
by, as these evidentialists certainly do not treat other unjustified justifiers, such as experiences, in 
this way²dividing them between the funky and non-funky and claiming only the non-funky 
contribute to epistemic justification. Accordingly, even if the present response to the problem of 
IXQN\GLVSRVLWLRQVLVQRWRQLWVRZQDVSODXVLEOHDV)HOGPDQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHREMHFWLRQIURP
irresponsible evidence gathering, and even if is not clearly satisfactory, I conclude that 
                                                          
54
 )HOGPDQ³5HVSHFWLQJWKH(YLGHQFH´ 
33 
 
33 
 
evidentialists should nonetheless take it very seriously because it is arguably the best option they 
have. 
 Let me turn, then, to my second contention: that the availability of the present synthesis 
of evidentialism and virtue epistemology is in fact one last positive reason to favor Strong 
DispES. To see this, begin with the observation that it is the presence of examples just like those 
I have been discussing which has led Baehr, and apparently Conee and Feldman,55 to prefer 
some sort of synthesis of evidentialism and virtue epistemology. Such a synthesis is attractive 
precisely because it helps to address these kinds of examples. But, what I want to argue here is 
that the Aristotelian synthesis I have proposed is superior to the leading current proposal for such 
a synthesis²a proposal offered by Baehr. Thus, not only does this Aristotelian synthesis provide 
the resources for the advocate of Strong DispES to respond to the problem of funky dispositions; 
but, it offers a third positive reason to favor Strong DispES to its rivals. For, Strong DispES is 
easily incorporated into a synthesis of evidentialism and virtue epistemology which is preferable 
to the leading current synthesis of these views; and some sort of synthesis of these views is 
amply motivated. 
 Consider the proposed synthesis of evidentialism and virtue epistemology offered by 
Baehr:  
%DHKU-XVWLILFDWLRQ6LVMXVWLILHGLQEHOLHYLQJSDWWLIDQGRQO\LI6¶VHYLGHQFHDWWDSSHDUVWR
S to support p, provided that LI6¶VDJHQF\PDNHVDVDOLHQWFRQWULEXWLRQWR6¶VHYLGHQWLDO
situation with respect to p, S functions, qua agent and relative to that contribution, in a 
manner consistent with intellectual virtue.  
Clearly, Baehr Justification is a mouthful. This may be one reason to be suspicious of it. At 
bottom, it provides a disjunctive account of justification. A proposition is justified just in case 
either FHUWDLQFRQVWUDLQWVDUHPHWDQGWKHEHOLHYHU¶VDJHQF\GRHVQ¶WPDNHDVDOLHQWFRQWULEXWLRQRI
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a certain kind C or FHUWDLQGLIIHUHQWFRQVWUDLQWVDUHPHWDQGWKHEHOLHYHU¶VDJHQF\does make a 
salient contribution of kind C. Disjunctive accounts should be viewed with suspicion because of 
their complexity. 
 And there is a more powerful reason to be suspicious of Baehr Justification. It is that 
Baehr Justification fails to account for what is valuable in the cases of those who manifest 
intellectual vice while believing what their evidence supports. It fails to account for the fact that 
there is some sense in which the subjects in such examples ought to believe what they do. That 
there is some sort of value achieved by these subjects is a point Baehr himself appears to 
appreciate in a footnote from his chapter on these issues where he claims that the subjects from 
examples involving defective inquiry do KDYHMXVWLILFDWLRQRI³WKHVWDQGDUGGHontological 
YDULHW\´%XWLIWKH\GRBaehr Justification certainly does not tell us so. Thus, at the very best, 
Baehr justification offers us a disjointed thesis about only one dimension of epistemic evaluation. 
 But the Aristotelian synthesis above promises more. It accounts for what is valuable in 
the cases of defective inquiry or funky dispositions, as well as what is disvaluable in these cases. 
Because it does, and because Strong DispES is used to construct this synthesis, we have a third 
reason for an internalist evidentialist to prefer Strong DispES to its rivals.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
,QWKLVSDSHU,KDYHDUWLFXODWHGDQRYHODFFRXQWRIZKHQDSHUVRQ¶VHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWVD
proposition and argued that this account is attractive from the perspective of internalist 
evidentialist views in epistemology. I defended three reasons in favor of the account. First, the 
account avoids problems arguably faced by rival accounts of evidential support. Second, it 
provides the evidentialist with an approach to responding to the problem of forgotten evidence 
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which avoids problems of alternative approaches. And, third, it is easily employable in an 
attractive synthesis of evidentialism and virtue epistemology.  
